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especially those of the Economics department at the University of Cambridge.We study the consequences of heterogeneity of switching costs in a dynamic model
with free entry and an incumbent monopolist. We identify the equilibrium strategies
of the incumbent and of the entrants and show that the strategic interactions are
more complex and more interesting than either in static models or in models where
all consumers have the same switching costs. In particular, we prove that even low
switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there are more of them
its prots increase. Indeed, their presence hinders entrants who nd it more costly
to attract high switching cost customers. This leads to dierent comparative statics:
for instance, an increase in the switching costs of all consumers can lead to a decrease
in the prots of the incumbent.1. Introduction
On February 6, 2007, in the same well-known letter in which he called for an end to
DRM (Digital Rights Management) for music distributed in electronic form, Steve
Jobs discussed the incumbency benets that the iPod enjoyed thanks to iTunes'
proprietary format (Jobs, 2007). He noticed that
\[s]ome have argued that once a consumer purchases a body of music
from one of the proprietary music stores, they are forever locked into only
using music players from that one company. Or, if they buy a specic
player, they are locked into buying music only from that company's music
store."
He argued that on average there are \22 songs purchased from the iTunes store
for each iPod ever sold", and that this implied that \under 3% of the music on the
average iPod is purchased from the iTunes store and protected with a DRM." He
concluded that there was no lock-in as it is \hard to believe that just 3% of the
music on the average iPod is enough to lock users."
In a response to Jobs' statement, Jon Lech Johansen1 made the following interesting
points:
\Many iPod owners have never bought anything from the iTunes Store.
Some have bought hundreds of songs. Some have bought thousands. At
the 2004 Macworld Expo, Steve revealed that one customer had bought
$29,500 worth of music."
Therefore, the lock-in is non negligible as
\it's the customers who would be the most valuable to an Apple com-
petitor that get locked in. The kind of customers who would spend $300
on a set-top box."
In essence, Johansen argued that the consumers that matter, those who buy lots
of online music, have high switching costs, and therefore that an entrant in the
market will face large obstacles attracting them. As we will discuss in Section 4, in
the simplest economic model of switching costs, with one incumbent and free entry,
Johansen is wrong: heterogeneity of switching costs does not matter. If a proportion
 > 0 of the agents have switching cost  > 0, while the others have no switching
cost, then the prots of the incumbent will be equal to , the average switching
cost of all the consumers, multiplied by the number of agents. This would imply
1See Johansen (2007). Jon Lech Johansen, also know as \DVD Jon" is a \hacker" made famous
by his work on reverse engineering of data formats, and in particular on the DVD licensing
enforcement software (see http://nanocr.eu/, last visited on 31 January 2010).
1that Steve Jobs is not underestimating the value of incumbency by assuming that all
consumers have the same switching cost.
We show that this result changes drastically in a dynamic model in which there
are new potential competitors in every period; then Johansen is right: the more
skewed the distribution of switching costs, the greater the prots of the incumbent.
To the best of our knowledge, this fact and the importance of the distribution of
switching costs has not been recognized in the literature, despite the existence of a
signicant body of theory which explores the consequences of consumer switching
costs. (We discuss the literature below in Section 2.)
Our results have policy implications. Because, as we show, larger industry wide
switching costs can lower the prots of the incumbent, competition authorities
should not use a per se rule that any action which has the eect of raising them is
anti-competitive. A more careful evaluation is needed.
We conduct our analysis by constructing a series of models that share the following
features: a) the switching costs of consumers are invariant over time; b) at the start
of the `game' there is a single incumbent rm; and c) there is free entry by competing
rms in every period. Following much of the literature, we assume that only short
term contracts are used and that a consumer's switching cost does not depend on
the rm from which it is purchasing.
In Section 3, we introduce our analysis by considering the case where all consumers
have the same switching costs . In a one period model, the incumbent would
charge , and, assuming that the mass of consumers is equal to 1, its prot would
also be equal to . We show that its equilibrium aggregate discounted prot over all
periods is also equal to  when we embed this static model in a dynamic framework,
whether the number of periods is nite or, subject to stationarity assumptions,
innite. In the latter case, this implies that the prot of the incumbent is equal to
the value of a ow of per period payments equal to (1   ), not to ! Although
this result is very easy to prove, and is implicit in some of the literature, we feel
that it is worth stressing as it shows that switching costs are a leaner cash cow than
sometimes assumed.
We begin our analysis of the heterogeneity of switching costs in Section 4, where
we study the dynamic version of the model which we sketched above when describing
the Jobs-Johansen debate: a proportion  2 (0;1) of consumers have a switching cost
equal to  > 0, while the others have no switching cost. We identify the (stationary)
equilibrium of the innite horizon model. As opposed to the case where all consumers
have the same switching cost, the intertemporal prot of the incumbent is greater
than the one period prot, although it is smaller than the value of an innite stream
of one period prots. We prove that even zero switching customers have value for the
incumbent: when there are more of them its prots increase. Indeed, their presence
hinders entrants who nd it more costly to attract high switching cost customers.
In order to conduct more complete comparative statics, in Section 5, we generalize
the model of Section 4 by assuming that the low switching cost consumers have
2strictly positive switching costs. For technical reasons, we turn to a two period
model. For a large class of parameters decreasing the switching costs of all consumers
increases the prots of the incumbent. By itself, a decrease in the high switching
cost decreases the prots of the incumbents. On the other hand, a decrease in the
low switching cost increases the eagerness of the less protable low switching cost
consumers to change supplier and makes the entrants less aggressive. This second
eect can dominate the rst in many non-pathological cases.
The conclusion discusses further research as well as policy implications.
2. Literature
The literature has distinguished switching cost models proper and subscription
models: in switching cost models, a rm must charge the same price to both current
and new consumers, while in subscription models it can oer dierent prices to
consumers with dierent purchase histories of its products. Switching cost models
were introduced in the economics literature by2 Klemperer (1987b) (see the surveys
of the theoretical literature in Klemperer (1995), Annex A of Oce of Fair Trading
(2003), and Farrell and Klemperer (2007), and the discussion of policy implications
in Oce of Fair Trading (2003), especially Annex C). Chen (1997) initiated the
investigation of subscription models. We present our model as a switching cost model,
but, as we point out later in this section, because of free entry, our results would be
the same if the model was a subscription model.
Much of the switching cost literature focuses on two-period duopsony models in
which rms choose between charging a high price in order to extract rents from their
customers and charging a low price in order to attract customers from their rivals.
In this framework, Klemperer (1987a) shows that higher switching costs may make
entry more likely, by inducing incumbents to abandon the hope of attracting the
customers of other incumbents and therefore choosing higher prices. In our model,
where new entrants provide the only eective competition, incumbents never try to
attract customers from other incumbents. Our comparative statics are entirely the
consequence of the heterogeneity of switching costs. Dub e, Hitsch, and Rossi (2006)
present an innite horizon model where a single consumer has random utility and
rms have dierentiated products. While their focus is on empirics, they provide
numerical examples where prices may fall when switching costs are present.
Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla (1995), and
Anderson, Kumar, and Rajiv (2004) study innite horizon switching cost models,
in each of these cases with two rms and homogenous switching costs;3 they focus
on the evolution of market shares and on the eect of switching costs on prices.
2See also Klemperer (1983) and Klemperer (1986).
3Beggs and Klemperer assume that consumers are horizontally dierentiated, but that, once they
have purchased from a rm, they never buy from another rm.
3Klemperer (1986) studies an innite horizon model with homogeneous switching cost
and free entry by rms. By contrast, we focus our analysis on the consequences of
the heterogeneity of switching costs in the presence of free entry.
The paper that is closest to ours is Taylor (2003). He analyzes a nite horizon
subscription model where consumers have dierent switching costs and where there
is free entry. In his primary model, consumers draw new switching costs from
identical, independent distributions in each period. He shows that free entry limits
the advantages of incumbency and that a rm makes zero expected prots from
the consumers that it attracts from its rivals. In an extension, Taylor examines a
two period model with two types of consumers who draw their switching cost (as
before, independently in each period) from dierent distributions. His focus is on the
incentives of consumers to build a reputation of having low switching cost in order
to get better oers in the future.
In our model, switching costs are constant over time and this implies that it is
harder for an entrant to attract the more valuable consumers, those with higher
switching costs, than to attract the less valuable customers. As in Taylor, the
presence of low switching cost consumers hurts the high switching cost consumers,
but in our model, we show that it can also increase the incumbent's prot.
Finally, in our model, because of free entry, incumbent rms nd it just as dicult
as entrants to attract customers of other rms. Therefore, incumbent rms, just
like entrants, make zero prots on customers of other rms, and in equilibrium they
ignore them when choosing the price they charge. As a consequence, our model would
generate exactly the same results if we transformed it into a subscription model.
3. When all consumers have the same switching cost: You
cannot get rich on switching costs alone
In this section, we consider a repeated version of the most standard textbook model
of switching cost, with one incumbent and free entry. We show that, in equilibrium,
the prot of the incumbent is equal to its prot in the one period version of the
game. This is true for all equilibria when there are a nite number of periods, and
for stationary equilibria when there are an innite number of periods. We begin by
presenting the one period version of the model and then turn to the repeated game
with a nite number of periods.
There is a continuum of consumers with mass normalized to 1, and a good which
can be supplied by a number of rms, as we will describe below. Each consumer has
a perfectly inelastic demand for one unit of the good, and therefore always buys one
unit either from the incumbent or from one of the entrants. In this section only, all
consumers have the same switching cost . This switching cost is incurred every
time a consumer changes from one supplier to another. It reects industry wide
similarities or compatibilities between products, rather than idiosyncrasies of specic
4sellers. This implies, for instance, that our comparative statics results which describe
the consequences in changes of the switching costs bear on circumstances where the
cost of changing between any pair or products increase or decrease.
In previous periods, the consumers have bought from the incumbent,4 rm I.
We do not study the process by which rm I became the incumbent, but only the
continuation game after entry is possible. In general, at least some of the incumbency
rents which we identify would have been dissipated in the competition to become
the incumbent.
Let us consider rst a one period model with a denumerable number of entrants
who can enter the market at zero cost in each period. The main focus of our study
is the following \Bertrand" game:
Stage 1: The incumbent and the entrants set prices;
Stage 2: The consumers choose from which rm to buy.
All of our qualitative results also hold true, and are sometimes easier to establish,
in the \Stackelberg" version of this game:
Stage 1: The incumbent sets a price;
Stage 2: The entrants set their prices;
Stage 3: The consumers choose from which rm to buy.
Assuming, as we will throughout this paper that all rms have zero marginal cost,
it is easy to prove that, in both the Bertrand and Stackelberg versions of the game,
there is only one equilibrium, where the incumbent5 charges , the entrants 0, and
all consumers buy from the incumbent. We will show that in the repeated version of
the game, the discounted intertemporal prot of the incumbent is not increased: it
is still equal to . One can only pocket the switching cost once.6
This is easy to prove when there are two periods. Formally, we expand the
game above by assuming that every entrant that has sold to a positive measure of
consumers in the rst period becomes a second period incumbent, and that there
are new entrants, again in denumerable number,7 in the second period. In all the
4In the dynamic version of the model, there could be, in some periods t > 1, several incumbents,
i.e., rms who have sold goods to a positive mass of consumers in previous period.
5The results would be the same with several incumbents.
6Although the model we use is a trivial extension of the most elementary model of switching costs,
we have not found in the literature a clear statement of what happens when this game is repeated,
with new entrants in every period; almost all of the literature focuses on the case of duopsony,
where the same two rms compete again each other period after period.
7For the two period model, two entrants would be enough, but we need more in the innite horizon
models that we will discuss later.
5paper, we assume that rms cannot discriminate between consumers, for instance as
a function of their past purchasing histories, and also that they cannot commit to
prices beyond the current period.
In equilibrium, whether in the Bertrand or Stackelberg model, all second period
incumbents charge , and make prots equal to  multiplied by the number of
their rst period customers. Therefore, competition between rst-period entrants
pushes the price that they charge down to  , where  2 (0;1] is the discount rate.
Consumers know that all incumbents will charge  in the second period. Hence,
rm I will be able to \keep" its customers only by charging a price less than or equal
to   + . It is straightforward to show that that it indeed charges this price, and
therefore that it \keeps" all its customers. Hence its discounted prot is
(  + ) +  = :
An easy proof by induction shows that the same result holds with any nite number
of periods.
We now show that the same result holds true in the innite horizon version of
this model (we now assume  < 1). In each period, we assume only a nite number
of \active" entrants oer the good. We look for subgame perfect equilibria which
satisfy conditions which we describe informally below and dene formally in the web
appendix of this paper (Biglaiser, Cr emer, and Dobos, 2009).
The rst condition which we impose eliminates the following type of situations: an
entrant makes a better oer than the incumbent, taking into account the fact that
the consumers have to pay the switching cost . However, every consumer believes
that the others will refuse the oer and, therefore, he would be the only one to accept
it. Since we assume that rms who do not have a positive measure of consumers at
the end of the period are not active in the future,8 after deviating our consumer will
have to pay the switching cost once again in the following period. Therefore, it is an
equilibrium for all consumers not to accept the oer. To eliminate this equilibrium
we assume that \consumers have mass" by allowing small groups of consumers to
coordinate on a strategy: if an (arbitrarily small) group of them is strictly better o
purchasing from an entrant, then they do so.9
Our second set of conditions dene the stationary10 requirements which we impose
on the pricing strategy of the rms: we search for equilibria where the pricing
8We make this assumption so that we need not worry about the policy used by a rm that has a
set of consumers which is not empty but has measure 0.
9In many models of network externalities, it is assumed that the consumers coordinate on the
purchasing decision which maximize their utility. We do not make this assumption. In a dynamic
model, either we would have to assume that they are able to coordinate on a, potentially innite,
sequence of moves, which requires very strong coordination, or that this coordination has a
myopic component, which is not very attractive. Furthermore, as the game progresses even
similar consumers can nd themselves in situations where they face dierent payos moving
forward; their interest might diverge.
10In a companion paper, Biglaiser and Cr emer (2009) prove that there exist many other equilibria
6strategies of active rms only depend on whether consumers with positive switching
costs (that is, the protable consumers) purchased from them in the previous period.
In particular, the incumbents who have a positive measure of protable customers
always choose the same price (or the same distribution of prices) whatever the history,
and the lowest price charged by an entrant is the same (or has the same distribution)
in all periods.
Finally, as is standard in one period Bertrand models with dierent costs for the
dierent rms, we assume that the rms play undominated strategies.
We now state and sketch the proof of the main result of this section.
Proposition 1. In both the Stackelberg and the Bertrand models, when all consumers
have the same switching costs , the intertemporal discounted prot of the incumbent
is equal to , whatever the number of periods.
Therefore, as in the two period model, the incumbent can only collect the switching
cost once: he only gets one bite at the apple.
The result has been proved with a nite number of periods. When their number is
innite, let  be the present discounted prot of an incumbent rm which supplied
all consumers in the previous period. By the stationarity assumption, this prot is
independent of the rm's name and of the date. Entrants are willing to charge  
to attract all the buyers. As in the two period model, consumers know that their
welfare in subsequent periods does not depend on the identity of rm they choose
to purchase from in the current period, and the incumbent will have to set a price
equal to   +  in order to keep its customers.11 Hence, the equilibrium prot of
the incumbent satises
 = (  + ) +  = :
In every period the entrants charge  , while the incumbent charges (1 ), which
does yield a discounted prot equal to . (See Appendix A for a formal proof.)
4. Heterogeneity of switching costs increases the prots of
the incumbent and hurts consumers
We now turn to the main theme of the article: the consequences of heterogenous
switching costs. In this section, we study a model with two types of consumers: high
switching cost (hsc) consumers, who are a fraction  2 (0;1) of the population, have
a switching cost equal to  > 0, while low switching cost (lsc) consumers, who form
a fraction 1  of the population, have a switching cost equal to 0. In the one period
of this game, which satisfy a weaker version of stationarity: although the outcome of the game is
stationary (with prices in each period as low as 0 or as high as ), after a deviation incumbents
may charge prices dierent from the prices along the equilibrium path.
11Technically, the incumbent will charge   + , the entrants charge   and in the continuation
equilibrium, all the consumers buy from the incumbent.
7model, competition drives the prices of entrants to 0, while the incumbent charges a
price of , and obtains a prot equal to : its prots are the average switching cost
of consumers multiplied by their mass. We analyze the innite horizon version of
this game.
4.1. Results
As in the model where consumers have the same switching costs, we restrict attention
to equilibria that satisfy the \consumers have mass" condition, the stationarity
conditions, and where players do not use weakly dominated strategies.
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2. In the innite horizon model, where  consumers have switching
costs equal to  > 0, while the remaining consumers have 0 switching costs, under
either Stackelberg or Bertrand competition
i. the expected prot of the incumbent is
 =

1    + 
: (1)
ii.  is greater than the prot of the incumbent in the one period model, , but
smaller than the value of an innite stream of one period prots, =(1   ).
iii.  is strictly smaller than , but lim
!1
 =  for all .
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition show that, contrary to what happens when
all consumers have the same switching costs, the intertemporal prot is not equal
to the one period prot, but is greater; however the per period prot is smaller in
the innite horizon model than in the one period model. Finally, part (iii) shows
that when the agents are very patient, the prot of the incumbent is independent
of the proportion  of hsc consumers, whereas in the one period model prots are
proportional to . As we will explain below, lsc consumers, who always purchase
from the lowest price entrant, make it more costly to attract protable hsc customers
away from the incumbent.
Proposition 2 yields interesting comparative statics, which we summarize in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Proposition 2:
i.  is increasing in ,  and ;
ii. for a given average level of consumer switching costs, , the prot of the
incumbent, , is decreasing in ;
iii. adding lsc consumers without changing the number of hsc consumers in-
creases ;
iv. under Stackelberg competition, the utility of hsc consumers is an increasing
function of .
8Parts (i) and (ii) of the corollary are obvious from equation (1). Part (iii) is easy
to prove. Assume that we add a mass  > 0 of lsc consumers; the total mass
of consumers becomes 0 = 1 +  and the proportion of hsc consumers becomes
0 = =(1 + ). The new prots are
0 = (1 + )
0
1    + 0
=

1    + 
1+
;
which is increasing in . Lsc consumers are valuable to the incumbent, even though
they never buy its product, as they make it more costly for entrants to make aggressive
discounts in order to attract hsc customers.
Although they lead to the same prots for the incumbent, the equilibria under
Bertrand and Stackelberg competition are very dierent. Under Stackelberg com-
petition, the incumbent oers the same price in every period, and hsc consumers
never change suppliers. On the other hand, in Bertrand competition, the incumbent
and the entrants play mixed strategies, and in each period there is a strictly positive
probability that all the hsc consumers change suppliers. As switching is socially
wasteful and as the prots of the incumbent are the same in these two models,
consumer surplus and social welfare is lower under Bertrand than under Stackelberg
competition. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Corollary 2. In the innite horizon model, where a proportion  of the consumers
have switching costs equal to  > 0, while the others have zero switching costs, con-
sumer surplus and welfare is lower under Bertrand competition than under Stackelberg
competition.
Before proceeding, remember that, as we have discussed in Section 3, our com-
parative statics results assume that the changes in switching costs that apply to all
changes from one supplier to another. A consumer who chooses to switch in the
rst period from the incumbent to an entrant would have to nd that his cost of
switching once again, to a future entrant, has also increased. On the other hand,
the result does not apply if the increase in switching costs applies only to a switch
from the incumbent to a period 1 entrant. From a policy point of view, this implies
that our theory can illuminate changes which aect the whole industry, for instance
changes in standards or new regulations such as number or bank account portability.
We now present an informal proof of Proposition 2, starting with the Stackelberg
case, which is easier to analyze. Complete proofs are presented in Appendices B
and C.
4.2. Analysis of Stackelberg competition
By stationarity, hsc consumers know that the price that they will face in future
periods is independent of the rm they choose in the current period. Hence, they
9will denitely switch suppliers if the dierence of price is strictly greater than  and
denitely not switch if this dierence is strictly smaller than . In the rst period,
entrants will be willing to underbid the incumbent by (slightly more than)  as long
as the price it charges is (strictly) greater than   + . Hence, the incumbent will
charge   +  and sell to the  high cost customers at this price.12 Therefore,
 =   (  + ) +  =)  =

1    + 
: (2)
This implies that the price charged, in every period, by the incumbent, and paid by
the hsc consumers, is equal to
pS  
1   
1    + 
: (3)
In the next stage of the game one or several entrants charges and attract all the lsc
consumers.
4.3. Analysis of Bertrand competition
In the Bertrand game, there is no equilibrium in which the incumbent charges
pS =   +  and at least one entrant charges pS    =  . Indeed, if the
incumbent did not retain all the hsc customers, he would have incentives to decrease
its price; if it retained them, the entrant would attract only the lsc consumers, who
generate no prot in future periods, at a negative price. More generally, it is easy
to show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium of the game, but we will still be
able to show that the prots of the incumbent are equal to the prots in Stackelberg
competition.
We do this by proving that, if  is the (expected) prot of the incumbent, then
  +  belongs to the support of the distribution of prices that it announces;
furthermore when it chooses this price, its hsc customers purchase its product with
probability 1. This will imply that equation (2) holds. (More precisely, we will show
that   +  is the lower bound on the support of prices charged by the incumbent,
and that when it chooses a price arbitrarily close to this lower bound, it `keeps' the
hsc customers with probability arbitrarily close to 1.)
Lsc consumers always purchase from one of the lowest price sellers. By the
stationarity hypothesis, hsc consumers who change suppliers can never gain from
purchasing from an entrant which does not charge the lowest price: in the next
period, any entrant who has attracted customers and become an incumbent will
12More precisely, along the equilibrium path the incumbent charges   +  and the entrants
charge 0 (so as not to subsidize lsc consumers who would bring them no future prots). In any
continuation equilibrium after one or several entrants charge  , at least some hsc consumers
buy from the incumbent. In any continuation equilibrium after the incumbent charges more than
  + , some entrants charge  .
10charge the same price. Hence, calling pE the lowest price charged by an entrant
and pI the price charged by the incumbent, hsc consumers buy from the incumbent
if pI < pE +  and from one of the lowest price entrants if pI > pE + .
In the current period, the aggregate revenues of all the entrants who charges pE
is equal to pE times the mass of (lsc and hsc) customers that they attract. By
stationarity, their total future prots discounted to the next period are smaller than
or equal to . Any pE <   would generate strictly negative discounted prots in
the aggregate for the lowest price entrants, and therefore bE, the lower bound of the
support of the strategies of entrants, is greater than or equal to  .
Clearly, the incumbent never charges less than bE +. Furthermore, bE cannot be
strictly greater than  : otherwise, an entrant could attract all the consumers and
make strictly positive discounted prots by charging a price in the interval ( ;bE).
Thus, bE =  , and it is possible to show that the distribution of the lowest prices
charged by the entrants does not have a mass point at this price.13 Therefore, when
the incumbent charges a price close to   +  (which is the lower bound of the
prices it charges), it `keeps' all the hsc customers, and in all stationary equilibria
equation (2) must hold.
5. Lower switching costs for all buyers can lead to higher
prots for the incumbent
In Section 4, the switching cost of lsc consumers is equal to zero; with an innite
horizon, we have not been able to extend the analysis14 to the case where all consumers
have strictly positive switching costs. This prevents us from examining questions
such as the consequences of an increase in the switching cost of all consumers (which
we will show can decrease the prots of the incumbent!). Therefore, in this section
we consider a two period model where lsc consumers can have strictly positive
switching costs. This leads to new economic insights and to unexpected comparative
statics, which are presented in Proposition 3.
13If there was such a mass point, for some  > 0 the incumbent would never choose a price in
(bE + ;bE +  + ]: it could increase its prot by choosing a price slightly smaller than bE + 
and selling to its hsc customers with probability 1. Then, entrants who make at best zero prots
by charging   would obtain higher prots by charging any price in the interval (bE;bE + )
than by charging bE, which establishes the contradiction.
14When lsc consumers have zero switching costs, in every period they purchase from one of the rm
which charges the lowest price and that price is negative in equilibrium. Therefore, attracting
them generates no prot; this fact greatly simplies the analysis of the innite horizon model.
115.1. Results and intuition
There are two15 types of consumers: a mass  of hsc buyers, with a switching
cost equal to H, and a mass (1   ) of lsc buyers with a switching cost equal





which implies L < H. Thus, in the one period model the incumbent would
charge H, sell to all the hsc consumers and to no lsc consumer, and make a prot
equal to H. (In subsection 5.4, we study environments where inequality (4) does
not hold.)
The following proposition states our main result.
Proposition 3. In the two period model, where a proportion  of consumers have
switching costs equal to H while the others have switching costs equal to L with





(1 +    )

(5)
under either Stackelberg or Bertrand competition.  is greater than the one period
prot, H, and smaller than the discounted value of a ow of one period prot,
H(1 + ).
We discuss the proof of Proposition 3 in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Before doing so, we
comment on its economic signicance.
As in the innite horizon model of Section 4, the presence of lsc buyers enables
the incumbent to generate higher prots than it would receive in the one period
model. Furthermore, when specialized to the case L = 0, equation (5) is consistent
with equation (1): it yields  = H(1 + (1   )), which is equal to the value of a
ow of one period prots discounted at the rate of (1   ), as in equation (2). It
is also worth noticing that as  converges to 1,  converges to H, the one period
prot, as we would expect from point iii of Proposition 2.
Corollary 3. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3
i.  is increasing in  and H and decreasing in L;
ii. If  < (L + H)=2H, which is always satised if  < 1=2, then an equal
increase in H and L leads to a decrease in  (@=@L + @=@H <0).
15We have studied a model with a continuum of switching costs. There exists an equilibrium in
pure strategies, which is easier to handle than the mixed strategy equilibrium of this paper, but
the study of the consequences of increasing the mass of lsc consumers is more dicult: among
other issues, we cannot use the simplifying assumption, which is often made in the literature,
that types are uniformly distributed.
12iii. If L < 2H=(1+); then a small increase in the number of lsc consumers
increases the prots of the incumbent.
Without surprise, when  or H increase, the prot of the incumbent increases. To
understand why an increase in L decreases prots, we note rst that the incumbent
will always price in such a way that it sells to no lsc consumer. Let us assume, only
for expository purposes, that only one entrant attracted customers in the rst period,
and let 0 > 0 be the proportion of the hsc customers that it attracted. Because the
lsc consumers are the most eager to switch suppliers, the entrant must also have
attracted all of them. Therefore, its second period prot is 0H if it charges H,
and (0 + (1   ))L if it charges L. If it has attracted the proportion  of hsc
customers such that















it will be indierent between charging L and H. From (6), it is straightforward
that an increase in L leads to an increase in : the benets of `keeping' the lsc
customers increases, thus the number of hsc consumers attracted in the rst period
must increase if the entrant is to be kept indierent between its two plausible second
period strategies. In equilibrium, in the rst period a proportion  of hsc consumers
purchase from the entrant: if fewer than this proportion did so, the entrant would
charge a low price in the second period, and be very attractive to hsc customers.16
Therefore when L increases, the rst period incumbent loses more customers, which
explains the result.
Whether an equal increase in both H and L will increase or decrease the prot
of the incumbent will therefore depend on the relative strengths of two opposing
eects, which, by (5), can be determined by evaluating the change in H(H  L).
Adding  to both H and L and taking the derivative for  = 0, we obtain result ii)
in Corollary 3: the negative consequences for the incumbent of an increase in L
swamps the positive consequences of an equal increase in H when  is small enough.
Part (iii)17 of the corollary is similar to part (iii) of Corollary 1. Note that it
requires a L smaller than the upper bound authorized by equation (4). Indeed,
when L is small, the same reasoning as in Section 4 holds: entrants do not want to
attract lsc customers, and an increase in their number makes them less aggressive.
16As we will see shortly, the entrant mixes between H and L in the second period.

















with respect to  for  = 0.
13On the other hand, when L is larger, lsc customers become valuable enough to
entrants that an increase in their number makes them more aggressive.
We now turn to the proof of the Proposition 3.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 3 for the Stackelberg model
In period 2, all the rms which sold strictly positive amounts in period 1 announce
their prices rst, followed by the entrants, who in equilibrium charge 0. The
incumbents charge H if the proportion of hsc buyers among their period 1 consumers
is strictly greater than L=H and L if it is strictly less than H=L; if this
proportion is exactly equal to H=L, they will be indierent between L and H,
and charge either one of these two prices with probability 1, or mix between the two.
If the rm from which it purchased in period 1 charges H in period 2, a lsc
consumer will choose to purchase from a period 2 entrant at a price of 0. Hence, his
total period 2 cost will always be exactly L, whatever he does in period 1. As a
consequence, if, as above, we denote by pE the lowest price charged by any entrant
in period 1 in response to the period 1 price pI charged by the incumbent, lsc
consumers will purchase from one of the lowest price entrants if pE + L < pI, from
the incumbent if pE +L > pI, and from one or the other if pE +L = pI. Eectively,
lsc customers minimize their cost in each period. Therefore, in equilibrium, the
expected value of the second period price of all the entrants who attract lsc customers
in the rst period must be equal to each other.
Because second period prices are increasing functions of the proportion of hsc
customers in the client ele of a rm, the hsc customers who purchase from an entrant
will also allocate themselves among the lowest cost rst period entrants, and it
cannot be an equilibrium for these entrants to charge dierent prices in the second
period. Therefore, the pricing strategy of the \successful" entrants will only depend
on whether or not in the aggregate they attracted a proportion of the hsc consumers
smaller than, equal to, or greater than , as dened in (6).
This enables us to prove the following lemma, which describes the continuation
payo of the incumbent as a function of the price it charges in the rst period. (The
proof is in Appendix D.)
Lemma 1. For a given price, pI, charged by the incumbent in the rst period:
i. if pI < (1   )L, the incumbent sells to all consumers in period 1 and to all
hsc consumers (at price H) in period 2. Its prot is pI + H.
ii. if pI 2 ((1 )L;(1 )H), the incumbent sells to all hsc consumers in both
periods and to no lsc consumer in either period. Its prot is (pI + H).




, the incumbent sells to (1 ) hsc consumers
at price pI in period 1 and at price H in period 2, while its sales to lsc consumers
are equal to 0 in both periods. Its prot is (1   )(pI + H).
iv. if pI > (1   )H, the incumbent has zero sales in both periods.
14From Lemma 1, the prots of the incumbent are increasing on the intervals
( 1;(1   )L), ((1   )L;(1   )H) and
 
(1   )H;(1   )H

. Given the
restrictions that we have imposed on H=L, it is easy to check that it is maximized
on the union of these intervals for pI smaller than and `very close to' (1   )H.
Therefore, the only equilibrium of the game has the incumbent charging (1   )H
in the rst period with the continuation equilibrium described in point (iii), yielding
the prots described by equation (5). This proves Proposition 3 for the Stackelberg
model.18
5.3. Sketch of the proof of Proposition 3 in the Bertrand model
We divide this subsection in two parts. In the rst, we provide a short sketch of the
proof of equation (5), which is derived formally in Appendix E; in the second part,
we describe in detail one of the payo equivalent equilibria of the game.
5.3.1. Proving equation (5)
There are only mixed strategy equilibria in the Bertrand model, and we use a proof
similar to the proof in Section 4.3 to show that the prots of the incumbent are
the same as in the Stackelberg model. We sketch the argument in the rest of this
subsection and present the full proof in Appendix E.
In period 1, entrants never charge strictly less than  H: at this price, they
make zero prot even if they attract all the buyers. By exactly the same reasoning
as in the innite horizon case, this price must be in the support of the lowest price
charged by the entrants and  H + H must be in the support of the period 1
price charged by the incumbent. Because we show that the incumbent never sells to
a lsc customer in the period 1, its prot when it charges  H + H is
(1   )  [H(1   ) + H)];
where (1 ) is the number of (hsc) customers of the incumbent and H(1 )+
H is its discounted prot per customer. It is easy to check that this is indeed equal
to the  of equation (5).
5.3.2. What do equilibria look like?
The reasoning above is sucient to prove equation (5), but does not provide much
intuition about the equilibrium strategies of the agents. To help the reader build
this intuition we now describe explicitly one equilibrium of the Bertrand game.
18 The identication of the equilibrium can be easily extended to the case where the cost of shifting
from the incumbent to an entrant is 
0
L, greater but close to L which now is the cost of shifting
from a period 1 to a period 2 entrant. The entrants will still charge  L in the period 1, and the
total cost of the lsc consumers will be 
0
L. Apart from this, the equilibrium, and in particular
the prot of the incumbent, will not be aected.
15As discussed in section 4.3, in all equilibria the incumbent and the entrants use
mixed strategies in period 1. For simplicity, we present an equilibrium where there
is only one19 active entrant, who chooses its price pE in [ H; L], while the
incumbent chooses pI in [ H + H; L + H) and at least one other entrant
charges  L with probability 1. Then, all lsc customers buy from the entrant,
and, depending on the dierence between pI and pE, either all or a fraction  of hsc
customers purchase from the entrant:
ã if pI   pE  H, then all hsc consumers buy from the entrant, who therefore
charges H in the second period | its second period prot is H;
ã if pI  pE < H, a proportion  purchases from the entrant, who in the second
period uses a mixed strategy: he chooses prices L and H with probabilities
such that the hsc customers are indierent between switching and not switching
suppliers in period 1 | its second period prot is ( +(1 ))L = H (in
the states of nature where its second period price is H, all the lsc customers
switch to a period 2 entrant).
Therefore, in equilibrium, a proportion at least equal to  of the hsc consumers
purchase from the entrant in period 1.
The entrant chooses pE according to the following distribution GE, which has a






pE + (1 + )H
if pE2 [ H; L),
1 if pE=  L.
(7)
Then, if the incumbent chooses any pI 2 [H(1   );H   L), its expected
discounted prot is
GE(pI H)0+(1 GE(pI H))(1 )(pI+H) = (1 )H(1+ ): (8)
To see why the incumbent must choose a price in the interval [H(1 );H L),
we check for possible deviations. A) It is not protable for the incumbent to choose
a price greater than or equal to H   L, as this implies pI   pE  H with
probability 1, and no sales! B) To show that it is not protable to decrease prices
below H(1 ), we proceed in two steps. a) First, note that by charging H(1 ),
the incumbent sells to a proportion 1  of hsc customers. Claim E2 in Appendix E
shows that to increase its sales above this number the incumbent needs to choose
pI  H(1   ), which implies that as long as it does not sell to lsc customers, its
prot, (pI + H), is at most H which is smaller than (1   )H(1 +    ),
by (4). b) Second, in order to sell to lsc customers, the incumbent needs to make
their total costs, over both periods, less than L, which is the upper bound of their
19Our equilibrium is also an equilibrium if there are several active entrants and they each choose
a mixed strategy such that the distribution of the minimum of the prices they charge is the
function GE dened below.
16cost if they switch to the entrant in the rst period. Given that they will switch in
period 2 when it charges H, this necessitates pI  (1   )L, which leads to prots
pI + H smaller than the prots when using the equilibrium strategy.
Similarly, in our equilibrium the incumbent chooses pI according to the distribution
GI(pI) =
pI   H(1   )
pI   H(1   ) + ((1   ) + )(H   pI   L)
:
Then, the prot of the active entrant is
GI(pE + H)  (pE + L)(1    + ) + (1   GI(pE + H))(pE + H) = 0
when it chooses a price in [ H; L], and smaller than or equal to 0 when
it chooses a price outside of this interval (the presence of another entrant who
charges  L is crucial for this last point).
In all equilibria pI will be distributed according to GI and pE, interpreted as the
lower bound of the prices of the active entrants, will be distributed according to GE.
We will let the interested reader convince himself of this fact.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium strategies with H = 1, L = :2,  = :4 and  = 1.
5.4. Equilibrium with large L
For completeness, we now turn to a discussion of the equilibrium when equation (4)
does not hold. Proofs and more details can be found in Appendix E.
If L is very large, i.e., greater than H, then everything happens as if all the
consumers were lsc consumers: the incumbent charges L(1   ) in period 1, L in
period 2, and sells to all consumers. Its prot is L.
If L=H is smaller than but close enough to , then there is a pure strategy
equilibrium where in period 1 the incumbent sells to all the hsc consumers at a
price H(1   ) and the entrants sell to all the lsc consumers at a price  L. In
period 2, the incumbent charges H and `keeps' all the hsc customers | its prot
over both periods is therefore H. The best alternative strategy for the incumbent
would be to charge H   L in period 1, and sell to a proportion 1    of the hsc
consumers. This strategy becomes more attractive as L decreases, and dominates
when L=H < xC, where xC 2 (=(1 + );) solves





When L=H 2 (=(1 + );xC), we show in Appendix E that there exists the
same mixed strategy equilibrium as when L < 
1+H. The dierence is that now
the one period game prot is larger than the equilibrium prot and thus we need to
check for deviations where the incumbent could retain all the hsc customers.20
20In Appendix E we only prove that there exists an equilibrium which satisfy these properties, not
that all equilibria do although we believe that this may well be the case.




















Figure 1: This gure represents the probability distributions in the mixed strategies
of the incumbent and the entrant with H = 1, L = :2,  = :4 and  = 1,
which implies  = 37:5%. For instance, reading along the vertical dashed
line, if pE =  0:35, we obtain G(pE)  0:03, which implies that if the
incumbent chooses pI = 0:65 =  0:35 + H, then it looses all its hsc
customers with probability 3% and sells to a proportion 1  of them with
probability 97%. Similarly, if the entrant chooses pE =  0:35, it sells to a
proportion  of hsc customers with a probability 31% and to all of them
with probability 69%.
186. Conclusion
A signicant body of theory explores the consequences of consumer switching costs: it
highlights the role of \bargain then rip-o" pricing patterns, where a rm makes very
protable introductory oers and raises its price in subsequent periods. To the best of
our knowledge, the fact that the distribution of switching costs changes considerably
the way in which these strategies play out has not been pointed out. We hope the
present paper will contribute to close this gap. Taking into account the heterogeneity
of switching costs has enabled us to identify very rich strategic interactions between
the incumbent and the entrants and led to surprising comparative statics.
As we have seen, our analysis supports Johansen's insight that the distribution
of switching costs might be important in the music player industry. However,
our interpretation is dierent than his: the heterogeneity of switching costs could
be benecial to Apple not so much because it implies that there exist a subset
of consumers with very high switching costs, but rather because the presence of
customers with low switching costs makes an aggressive pricing strategy potentially
very costly for an entrant.
The liberalized UK domestic gas and electricity markets analyzed by NERA
in Oce of Fair Trading (2003) appears to broadly t the context we consider:
the product is homogenous, discrimination between old and new customers was
not an option, and entrants had to attract customers away from the historical
incumbent (British Gas and the public electricity suppliers) as there were practically
no unattached customers. Entrants oered prices below cost, and a fortiori below
those of the incumbent(s), which saw their market share decrease. Our analysis
shows that information on the distribution of switching costs, for which no data is
given, should have been gathered and that its consequences for the strategy of the
entrants should have been considered.
We now turn towards a discussion of questions which are open for research. First,
we have used a very stark model, with free entry and \many" entrants in every
period. Much of the literature on switching costs has emphasized models where
a limited number of incumbents compete over time, trying to vie for each other's
consumers. It is important to study the robustness of the conclusions of that part of
the literature to heterogeneity in switching.
On the theoretical side, we have not been able to identify the equilibria in a innite
horizon model, except in the case where the switching cost of the lsc consumers
is equal to 0. Solving this problem raises interesting, but dicult, questions; in
particular, we are not sure that a stationary equilibrium exists, or we do not even
know what would be the appropriate denition of stationarity for that case.
Finally, network externalities often play a role similar to switching costs | they
have sometimes been called `collective' switching costs. In future work, we plan to
study models where agents have dierent trade-os between size of network and
prices; we believe that phenomena similar to those analyzed in the current paper
19can be identied.
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22Appendices
A. Equilibrium in the innite horizon model when all
consumers have the same switching cost
In this appendix, we prove that the equilibrium price p in the Bertrand competition
innite horizon game where all consumers have the same switching cost  is equal
to (1   ).
This implies Proposition 2. The Stackelberg case is very similar and somewhat
easier to prove; we leave it to the reader.
Claim A1. p  (1   ).
Proof. Consumers who purchase from an incumbent incur a discounted cost p=(1 ).
In the current period, consumers who purchase from an entrant who charges p0 face
a disutility of p0 + . By stationarity, in each subsequent period they pay p; hence,
their total discounted disutility is
p0 +  +
p
1   
Consumers necessarily switch if21







Hence, for any " > 0, an entrant who would charge p  " would attract customers,
and obtain prots equal to the mass of consumers it attracts multiplied by




Writing that this expression is negative for all " > 0 yields the result.
Claim A2. p  (1   ).
Proof. In any period, the lowest priced entrant must charge p   : otherwise
the incumbent could increase its price without loosing customers.22 If the entrant
attracted customers at this price it would make prots equal to the mass of these
customers multiplied by p   +p=(1 ), which must be non negative for p  
to be undominated. This proves the claim.
Together, Claims A1 and A2 prove that p is equal to (1   ).
21This is true because of the \consumers have mass" assumption informally introduced on page 6
in Section 3 and more formally in Biglaiser et al. (2009): because an arbitrarily small group of
consumers would nd it optimal to purchase from the entrant, they will do it.
22Out of equilibrium, where there can be several incumbents, the reasoning would have to hold for
any incumbent.
23B. Stackelberg equilibrium in the innite horizon model
with two levels of switching costs
In this appendix, we present a formal version of the proof sketched in 4.2. We will do
so by proving that in all equilibria the equilibrium price charged by an incumbent,
p, is equal to pS as dened in (3).
We will call pE the minimum of the prices charged by any entrant (this minimum
exists as we are identifying equilibria with a nite number of active entrants in each
period).
Claim B1. p  pS.
Proof. By stationarity, if pE < p    all consumers purchase from one of the
lowest price entrants. The sum of the prots of these entrants is pE + p=(1   )
multiplied by the mass of consumers which they have attracted. This expression
must be negative for all p < p , otherwise there would be a feasible and protable
path to entry. Therefore,
p    +
p
1   
 0 () p  
1   
1    + 
= pS
Claim B2. p  pS.
Proof. We will show that if p < pS, a deviation by the incumbent to any p0 2 (p;pS)
would be protable. Indeed, entrants (there could be only one of them) who would
respond by charging p0    or less would generate aggregate discounted prots of at
most




(This is their prot if they attract all the hsc consumers.) If both p0 and p are
strictly smaller than pS, this expression is strictly negative. Therefore, at least
one of the entrants would be making strictly negative prots; the deviation by
the incumbent is protable, as entrants would not be able to respond and attract
consumers protably.
Claims B1 and B2 imply p = pS.
C. Bertrand equilibrium in the innite horizon model with
two levels of switching costs
In this appendix, we begin by proving that equation (1) must hold for any Bertrand
equilibrium. We then show that there indeed exists an equilibrium by exhibiting one.
24C.1. Proof of equation (1)
Most of the work consists in computing bounds on the distribution of prices charged
by the rms: bI and bI, respectively the lower and upper bounds of the support of
the prices charged by incumbent(s) as well as bE and bE the lower and upper bounds
of the distribution of the lowest price charged by the entrants.
Claim C1. Incumbents have strictly positive prots, which implies bI > 0:
Proof. We proceed by contradiction, and show that incumbents cannot have prots
equal to 0. Remember that we are looking for stationary equilibria: any entrant
who would attract consumers would become an incumbent in the next period, and
therefore make 0 prots. It is therefore a dominated strategy for entrants to oer
a negative price. Now assume that an incumbent deviates in period t and charges
p0 2 (0;(1   )). An upper bound for the total cost that an hsc consumer can
incur by purchasing from the incumbent in period t and switching in period t + 1 is
p0 +  < , which is a lower bound of the cost that he would incur by purchasing
from an entrant in period t. Therefore there exists a protable deviation for the
incumbent.
Claim C1 implies that in equilibrium lsc consumers never buy from the incumbent.
Claim C2. In any period, the expected discounted prot of entrants is equal to 0.
Proof. The expected discounted prots of entrants are the same for all prices in (bE,
bE). If the distribution of pE does not have a mass point at bE, then an entrant's
expected prot who chooses this price is 0. And there cannot be a mass point at
bE; otherwise, an entrant who would charge a price slightly below bE would make
strictly higher payos than charging bE, which cannot be true in equilibrium.
Claim C3. bE  0.
Proof. By Claim C1, with bE > 0, an entrant could make a positive prot by
charging a price in (0;minfbI;bEg), attract the lsc consumers (and, maybe, some
hsc consumers) with probability 1 and make strictly positive prots, which establishes
the contradiction due to Claim C2.
Claim C4. The expected discounted prots of an incumbent from any period t are
independent of the number of its lsc customers in period t   1.
Proof. By Claims C1 and C3, lsc customers never purchase from an incumbent.
This enables us to dene, without ambiguity,  as the prot of an incumbent from
whom all the hsc consumers purchased in the previous period. We will now proceed
to demonstrate that the incumbent equilibrium prot is the same in the Bertrand
and Stackelberg models.
25Claim C5. bE   .
Proof. In every state of nature where pE 2 [bE; ), the aggregate expected
discounted prots of the lowest price entrants would be strictly negative as their
current period losses exceeds their future discounted prots.
Claim C6. bI  bE + .
Proof. By announcing any price strictly smaller than bE + , the incumbent \leaves
money on the table".
Claim C7. bE   .
Proof. Otherwise, a price in the interval ( ;bE) would allow an entrant to become
the lowest price entrant with probability 1 while underpricing incumbents by more
than  (by Claim C6). It would make strictly positive prots, which establishes the
contradiction by Claim C2.
Claims C5 and C7 and the fact that entrants use a mixed strategy prove
bE =    bE: (C1)
Now, we pin down the lower bound on the prices charged by incumbents. Claim C6
and equation (C1) imply the following claim.
Claim C8. bI    + .
Claim C9. bI =   +  =  bE + .
Proof. By equation (C1) and Claim C8, we only need to prove bI    + . If
this were not true, by (C1), an entrant could make positive prots by choosing a
price in ( ;minfbI   ;bEg), which contradicts Claim C2.
Claim C10. When pI converges to bI from above, the proportion of hsc customers
who choose to purchase from an incumbent converges to 1.
Proof. The expected number of hsc customers of the incumbent is decreasing in pI.
Therefore, if the claim is not true, the proportion of hsc consumers who choose
to purchase from the incumbent is bounded above by some  < 1. This implies
that when the price it charges converges to bI, the total discounted prots of the
incumbent, if it sold to a proportion  of hsc customers in the previous period,
converges to23
(bI + ) < (bI + );
by Claim C9 it can guarantee itself a prot arbitrarily close to the right hand side
of this inequality by charging a price below, but very close to bI, which establishes
the contradiction.
23If some of the hsc consumers do not purchase from the incumbent, none of the lsc consumers
will.
26Claim C10 implies that, in any equilibrium, the prots of the incumbent take
the form described by equation (2). We now must prove that there exists such an
equilibrium. To do this we begin by deriving the distribution of prices that must
prevail in any equilibrium.
C.2. Distribution of prices in equilibrium
Assuming that an equilibrium does exist, we compute the distribution of pE and pI.
In C.3, we will show that these distributions do indeed constitute an equilibrium.
We begin by computing the distribution of prices announced by the incumbent.
Standard arguments show that this distribution GI of pI has no mass point on
(bI;bI). The zero prot condition for the entrants implies
GI(pE + )  [(1   )pE] + (1   GI(pE + ))  [pE + ] = 0 8pE 2 (bE;bE)
=) GI(pI) =
pI    + 
(pI   ) + 
8pI 2 (bI;bI): (C2)
Because lim
pI!bI
+ GI(pI) = 0 and lim
pI!bI
  GI(pI) = 1, the function GI has no mass point.
Similarly, the distribution GE of pE is determined by the fact that the prots of
the incumbent are equal to , for all prices in [bI;bI], and therefore
GE(pE) = 1  

(pE + ) + 




   (1   )
 + 
< 1;
the distribution GE has a mass point at pE = 0.
C.3. Existence of an equilibrium
We have proved that if there exists an equilibrium that satises our assumptions,
the distribution of prices must satisfy equations (C2) and (C3). We now prove
that there does indeed exist such an equilibrium; this is a proof by construction: we
exhibit the strategies followed by the agents.
In this equilibrium the consumers who buy from an entrant always buy from the
same (lowest price) entrant. The analysis which we have conducted to derive (C2)
and (C3), shows that these strategies are best responses for all the agents when
there is only one incumbent.
We need to examine the continuation equilibrium when there are several incumbents,
for two reasons: a) for the consumers to nd it optimal to coordinate on buying from
one incumbent, it must be the case that it is not a protable deviation for a small
mass of hsc consumers to purchase from another rm than the other hsc consumers;
27b) we have imposed the requirement that all incumbents, i.e., all rms that have
sold to hsc consumers in the previous period, use the same pricing strategy. As we
will see, the fact that the strategies of the rms satisfy b) provides an easy proof of
point a).
Let us therefore assume that in one period there are n  2 incumbents. It is
straightforward to see that if the distribution of pE is GE, then all the incumbents are
indierent between all prices in [bI;bI]. We now show that the prots of the lowest
price entrants are equal to 0 if all the incumbents choose the strategy described
by (C2).
Let i be the mass of hsc consumers of incumbent i = 1:::;n in the previous
period. The lowest price entrant sells to all the lsc consumers and to the mass of hsc
consumers who were in the previous period clients of rms who choose in the current
period a price pi  pE + . Because it will follow the same strategy as a unique
incumbent, and because the distribution of prices of the entrant is independent of
the number of incumbents, its prots discounted to the future of next period will be
=.
Therefore, for given prices by the incumbents, the prot of the entrant is

























where si is the random variable, of expected value i(1   GI(pE + )), that takes
the value i for pi  pE + and 0 otherwise. The pi's are independently distributed,
and therefore the expected value of
P
si(pi) is (1   GI(pE + )), and the expected
prot of the lowest price entrant, conditional of the fact that it has chosen a price of
pE, is
(1   )pE + (pE + )(1   GI(pE + ));
which, by equation (C2), is equal to 0.
The fact that all incumbents use the same pricing strategy implies that hsc
consumers have no incentive to deviate from the focal strategy that we described
above: in subsequent periods, they would face the same distribution of prices both
from the rm they purchased from in previous periods and from the entrants.
D. Equilibrium in the two period Stackelberg model
In this section, we prove Lemma 1. We begin by establishing three claims; the rst
one is part iv of the lemma.
Claim D1. If pI > (1   )H, the incumbent has zero sales in both periods.
28Proof. If pI > (1   )H, a unique lowest price entrant who would charge pE 2
( H;pI   H) would make strictly positive prots equal to pE + H, as it
would attract all consumers in period 1. Free entry prevents this, and therefore in
the continuation game, one or several entrants must charge  H, and attract all
the consumers while making zero prots.
Claim D2. If pI < (1   )H, then no entrant attracts enough hsc consumers in
period 1 that it nds it optimal to charge H with probability 1 in period 2.
Proof. Assume that entrant ~ e attracted a large enough proportion of hsc customers
that it found it optimal to charge H in period 2. Because lsc consumers always nd
it strictly more protable to switch suppliers than do hsc consumers, the incumbent
would have no lsc customers and, therefore, hsc customers can guarantee themselves
a second price of H by \staying with" the incumbent. Therefore, entrant ~ e must
have chosen a period 1 price p~ e  pI   H <  H <  L. This implies that no
entrant nds it protable to attract period 1 customers and charge L in period 2:
all entrants that attract customers must choose the same strategy as ~ e, and in
the aggregate their prots are smaller than p~ e + H < 0, which establishes the
contradiction.
Claim D3. If pI < (1   )H, all hsc consumers purchase from the incumbent in
period 1.
Proof. By Claim D2, any period 1 entrant who has attracted consumers in period 1
charges L with positive probability in period 2. Therefore, its second period prot
will be L times the mass of consumers it attracted in the rst period and, by
free entry, its period 1 price must be  L. The total discounted cost for a hsc
consumer who would purchase from a period 1 entrant would therefore be at least
( L + H) + L = H (it would be greater if in period 2 the entrant charged H
with a probability in (0;1)). If he purchases from the incumbent, his total cost is
pI + H, and therefore strictly lower, which establishes the claim.





, hsc consumers prefer to purchase from an entrant
if its period 2 price is L and from the incumbent if the entrant's period 2 price is H.
Therefore, there can be an equilibrium only if the entrants play a mixed strategy in
period 2, which is feasible only if in period 1 they attract a proportion  of the hsc
consumers. This establishes part iii of the lemma and completes the proof.
E. Equilibrium in the two period Bertrand model
In subsection E.1, we begin by deriving some properties of the equilibrium of the
two period Bertrand model which hold for any values of the parameters. Then,
29in E.2, we specialize the model to the case where equation (4) holds and prove
Proposition 3. Finally, in E.3, we conduct the analysis which leads to the \large L"
results discussed in 5.4.
E.1. Some properties of the equilibrium in the two period Bertrand
model
Because of free entry, period 2 entrants choose a price equal to 0. As in the Stackelberg
case, a period 2 incumbent charges L or H depending on whether the proportion
of its hsc customers in period 1 was less or greater than L=H, and, clearly, the
period 1 incumbent will charge H in period 2.
This implies that, as in the Stackelberg case, in period 1 lsc consumers will
optimally behave as if they were myopic, switching to one of the lowest price entrants
if the dierence between its price and the incumbent's price is greater than L and
not switching if this dierence is smaller than L. It also implies that any hsc
consumer who does not buy from the incumbent in period 1 also buys from one of the
lowest priced entrants. Indeed, any other entrant would attract only hsc customers,
and hence charge H in period 2.
We are now ready to study the pricing behavior of the rms in period 1. We begin
by Claim E1 which describes the behavior of entrants. Next, in Claims E2 and E3
we describe properties of the incumbent's rst period demand function. They help
us characterize the strategy of the incumbent, which enables us to compute the lower
bound on its prices of Claim E6.
Claim E1. In period 1, any active entrant charges a price in [ H; L].
Proof. Any entrant who has attracted consumers in period 1 will charge at least L
in period 2. Therefore, competition and free entry will ensure that in period 1 no
entrant which charges more than  L attracts a positive measure of customers with
positive probability. If the lower priced entrants charge prices strictly smaller than
 H, their aggregate prot is negative by the same line of reasoning as in the
proof of Claim D2.
Claim E2. If the incumbent charges a price strictly greater than H(1 ) in period
1, then it sells to at most (1   ) hsc customers.
Proof. Assume pI > (1   )H. Because  L + L < H(1   ), by Claim E1 all
the lsc consumers, who act myopically in the rst period, purchase from entrants.
If on the aggregate the entrants attract a proportion of hsc customers smaller
than , at least one of them will have a proportion of period 1 hsc customers
strictly smaller than L=H and therefore charge L with probability 1 in period 2.
Hsc customers would nd this entrant more attractive than the incumbent as
( L + H) + L < H(1   ) + H, which establishes the contradiction.
30Claim E3. If in period 1 the incumbent charges a price strictly smaller than
H(1   ), then it sells to at least (1   ) hsc customers.
Proof. If this were not the case, at least one of the entrants would attract enough hsc
customers in the rst period to charge H in the second period; by Claim E1, these
hsc customers would incur total discounted costs equal to at least  H+H+H,
which is strictly larger than the total discounted costs that they would incur from
buying from the incumbent in both periods.
Claims E2 and E3 show that for pI 2 (H(1   );H(1   )), the incumbent
sells to (1   ) customers. This implies the following claim.
Claim E4. The incumbent will never choose a rst period price in (H(1 );H(1 
)).
Claim E5. By choosing pI below but `close to' H(1   ), the incumbent can
guarantee itself discounted prots arbitrarily close to (1   )H(1    + ).
Proof. It sells to at least (1   ) hsc consumers at price (1   )H in period 1
and at price H in period 2.
Claim E6. bI  H(1   ).
Proof. The incumbent makes strictly positive prots. This implies that pE is not
strictly smaller than pI   H with probability 1. However, if bI > H(1   ) an
entrant could charge a price in ( H;bI+H) and obtain strictly positive expected
prots. In the states of nature where it is not the lowest priced entrant, it would
attract no consumers and make a prot equal to 0. When it is the lowest price
entrant, which would happen with strictly positive probability by Claim E1, it would
undercut the other entrants and also undercut the incumbent by more than H; its
discounted prot would be strictly positive, which establishes the contradiction.
E.2. Equilibrium in the two period Bertrand model for small L
In subsection E.1, we have not used any restrictions on ratio of switching costs, L=H.
We now restrict the analysis of the cases where equation (4) (L < H=(1 + ))
holds, which will enable us to prove Proposition 3.
Claim E7. If equation (4) holds, then at equilibrium bI > H(1   ).
Proof. From (4) and Claim E6, we have bI < L(1   ). By Claim E1, this implies
that the incumbent never sells to any lsc consumers. By Claim E2 if the incumbent
chooses pI > H(1   ), at least  hsc consumers buy from a period 1 entrant.
Thus, the highest prot the incumbent could make while selling to all hsc consumers
in period 1 is H(1 )+H = H. Using Claim E5, the incumbent can improve
its prot by charging a price larger than H(1   ), since equation (4) is equivalent
to H < (1   )H(1    + ).
31Claims E4, E6 and E7 imply bI = H(1   ) if L=H < =(1 + ). By
Claim E2 this implies that the discounted prot of the incumbent is bounded above
by
(1   )H(1    + H) = (1   )(bI + H):
By Claim E5, this quantity is also an lower bound on the prot, and this proves
Proposition 3.
E.3. Equilibrium in the two period Bertrand model when L=H is
greater than or equal to =(1 + )
In this subsection, we prove the results discussed in subsection 5.4. Note that we are
less ambitious than in E.2: we are only trying to identify one equilibrium for each
value of H=L, not to characterize all the equilibria. We present the results under
the form of three claims, starting with the largest value of L=H.
Claim E8. If L=H > , then the two period Bertrand game has a unique
equilibrium in which the incumbent charges L(1 ) in period 1 and L in period 2.
It sells to all consumers and its prots are L.
As in the one period model, when L > H the incumbent and the entrant act
as if there were only lsc customers in the economy. We leave the proof of the claim
to the reader.
For L=H 2 (xC;), with xC dened by (9), we establish the following claim:
Claim E9. If L=H 2 [xC;], there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which
the incumbent, whose prots are H, sells to the hsc consumers in both periods,
at prices respectively equal to H(1   ) and H. All lsc customers purchase from
entrants at price  L in period 1 and at price L in period 2.
Proof. We show that the strategies described in the claim form an equilibrium. The
lsc customers are clearly better o switching in period 1. The strategy of the hsc
customers is a best response to the strategy of the other agents as they are indierent
between purchasing from the incumbent in both periods and switching to an entrant
in the rst period | in both cases their total discounted costs are equal to H.
This indierence of hsc consumers implies that the incumbent would loose at least
a proportion  of its customers if it increased its period 1 price. It is straightforward
to see that, under these circumstances, its most protable increase in price is to
H   L. This deviation is unprotable as long as











32and therefore, by (9), holds on [xC;]. A small decrease in period 1 price obviously
decreases the prots of the incumbent. A decrease to L(1   ) allows it to sell to
all consumers in period 1, but decreases its prots.
Finally, it is easy to show that the entrants strategy is indeed a best response to
the strategies of the other agents.
Claim E10. The equilibrium described in 5.3.2 is also an equilibrium when L=H 2
[=(1 + );xC].
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as in 5.3.2, except that we need to be a bit
more careful when showing that the incumbent does not gain by deviating to pI in
(L(1   );H(1   )]. The incumbent sells to all the hsc customers if
pI + H < pE + H + L () pI < pE + (1   )H + L;
This implies that if pI 2 [(1      )H + L;(1   )H), the incumbent sells
to all the hsc consumers with probability strictly between 0 and 1 | in the other
states of nature, it sells to a proportion 1    of them. From (7), one can show that
this implies that the prots of the incumbent are increasing in this range, and that,
because  < L=H, they are always smaller than the putative equilibrium prot,
which establishes the claim.
33